Background
The fission energy released in U.S. light water-cooled reactors comes mostly from the chain-reacting isotope 235 U, which makes up 0.7% of natural uranium and several percent in their uranium fuel. Plutonium is produced as a result of neutron capture on 238 U, which makes up virtually all of the remainder of the uranium. If most of the 238 U could be converted to chain-reacting plutonium, which contains as much releasable fission energy per atom as 235 U, the energy that could be extracted from a gram of uranium could be increased about 100-fold.
During the 1960s and 1970s, the industrialized nations focused overwhelmingly on achieving this objective through the commercialization of sodium-cooled, fast-neutron reactors, which would be fueled by plutonium while breeding somewhat more plutonium from 238 U than they consumed. Programs were launched to reprocess spent light water-reactor fuel to recover the ~1% plutonium it contains for start-up cores for the breeder reactors.
All the economic premises on which these programs were launched turned out to be false: Sodium-cooled reactors were found to be considerably more costly and difficult to maintain than water-cooled reactors. The urgency of building much more uranium-efficient reactors was much reduced when world nuclear capacity plateaued at levels less than 1/10th those that had been projected for the year 2000 (2) . Because the demand was much lower than expected and because of the discovery of major new deposits of high-grade uranium, the price of natural uranium fell dramatically (3). Finally, commercial reprocessing of light water-reactor fuel turned out to be very costly (4, 5) .
History
Reconsideration of U.S. policies to promote a world powered by plutonium-fueled reactors began in 1974, after India shocked the world by testing a nuclear explosive made with plutonium separated with reprocessing technology provided by the United States (6) . Concern was also expressed that the projected global plutonium economy, in which millions of kilograms of plutonium would be separated out of spent fuel annually, might spawn nuclear terrorism. Less than 8 kg of plutonium is required to make a Nagasaki-type bomb (7-9).
The reassessment initiated by the Ford administration was completed by the Carter administration, which decided in 1977 against licensing for operation a newly built U.S. commercial reprocessing plant. The U.S. nuclear-energy establishment complained bitterly, and the Reagan administration reversed this policy after it came into office in 1981. By then, however, because of the adverse economics, there was no longer any industrial interest in reprocessing in the United States. In 1993, the Clinton administration reinstated U.S. opposition to reprocessing but did not reverse the Reagan administration's commitment not to interfere with plutonium-recycling programs in Western Europe and Japan (10) .
During the 1980s and early 1990s, the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, and France all abandoned their breeder-reactor demonstration programs. Russia and Japan still operate demonstration breeder reactors, completed in 1980 and 1993, respectively, but have not committed funding to build follow-on breeders. India is building a demonstration breeder reactor, and China is building a small experimental breeder reactor.
Tradeoffs
Commercial reprocessing continues on a large scale in Britain and France and, on a small scale, in Russia and Japan. The principal foreign customers for British and French reprocessing services have been German and Japanese utilities. Domestic political opposition to expanded at-reactor spent-fuel storage or central storage sites made shipment of spent fuel abroad for reprocessing their only alternative to shutting down their reactors. Storage of spent fuel is cheaper, safer, and more environmentally benign than reprocessing, which produces multiple types of radioactive waste that must be stored in any case, but host communities require assurances that interim spent-fuel storage will not become permanent (11) .
Last year, the German government agreed to allow extended spent-fuel storage at reactor sites if, by mid-2005, German nuclear utilities end shipments of spent fuel abroad for reprocessing (12) . Japan's utilities too are ending foreign reprocessing but are completing a ¥2.4 trillion (about US$20 billion) reprocessing plant that was committed in 1980. Because of the large number of high-paying jobs, the reprocessing plant is more acceptable to the local government than a stand-alone, interim, spent-fuel storage pool (13, 14) .
Given the loss of foreign customers, the continuation of the costly reprocessing of domestic spent fuel is being questioned in both Britain and France. A French government study concluded that, if France stops reprocessing in 2010, it will save 28 to 39 billion francs (US$4 to 5 billion) over the remaining lifetime of its current fleet of power reactors (15) .
With the indefinite postponement of commercial breeder reactors, the plutonium that has been separated by commercial reprocessing has become a disposal problem. As of the end of 1999, this still-growing stockpile amounted to about 200,000 kg (the equivalent of 25,000 Nagasaki bombs) (16) .
Some West European and Japanese utilities have launched programs to dispose of their stockpiles of separated plutonium by fabrication into mixed-oxide (MOX) uraniumplutonium fuel. This fuel can be substituted for about one-third of the low-enriched uranium fuel in most light water-reactor cores at a rate of about 400 kg plutonium/year in a 1000-megawatt (electric) reactor. There is no economic incentive for such use, however. Even when reprocessing is treated as a sunk cost, the cost of fabricating 200 tons of plutonium into MOX fuel would be billions of dollars more than the cost of the low-enriched fuel that it replaces. Britain and Russia, which together account for almost half of the world's stockpile of separated civilian plutonium, have not yet developed disposition policies. Additional disposition options are required (17).
The focus of U.S. Department of Energy reprocessing R&D during recent decades has been on "pyroprocessing" or electrorefining in a molten salt electrolyte as an alternative to the "PUREX" nitric acid-dissolution, organic solvent-extraction cycle used in current commercial reprocessing plants. Proponents say that, because pyroprocessing can be designed not to separate plutonium cleanly from other transuranic elements, its product could be more proliferation-resistant than the pure plutonium produced by conventional reprocessing. They also point out that it could be done at small-scale facilities. In fact, pyroprocessing R&D was a part of the U.S. Integrated Fast Reactor development program, which proposed a reprocessing and fuel-recycle plant be integrated into each reactor complex. This would result in a vast proliferation of facilities with remote processing capabilities for highly radioactive fuel, requiring only the installation of a final clean-up stage to produce separated plutonium that could be used for weapons.
It is difficult to imagine that any form of chemical reprocessing would be more proliferation-resistant in the short term than not reprocessing at all and leaving the plutonium mixed with highly radioactive fission products in the solid fuel matrix. Even 50 years after discharge, the radiation level from penetrating gamma rays a meter away from an assembly of spent light water-reactor fuel rods is 5 to 10 Sieverts/hour--enough to assure a lethal dose in less than an hour (18) . By comparison, virtually all of the radiation from separated plutonium is short-range alpha particles (helium nuclei), which cannot even penetrate human skin. If the plutonium is stored in a sealed container to protect against the hazard of the dispersal of inhalable plutonium-oxide particles, it is easily portable (see figure below).
Portability of separated plutonium. The canister held by this worker in Russia's commercial reprocessing complex near Chelyabinsk contains 2.5 kg of plutonium dioxide powder. The material in three of these easily portable containers would suffice to make a nuclear explosive. The complex's warehouses contain over 13,000 such containers. Proponents of reprocessing argue that burying plutonium-containing spent fuel creates an unacceptable long-term hazard, since the half-life of the most important plutonium isotope, 239Pu, is 24,000 years. Over the millennia, some of this radioactivity might find its way back to the surface environment. This has led to ambitious proposals (also mentioned favorably in the Cheney report) for chemical separation and neutron transmutation of all nonuranium, long-lived radioactive isotopes in spent fuel. However, such systems would greatly increase the cost of nuclear power. A National Academy of Sciences review concluded that "none of the dose reductions seem large enough to warrant the expense and the additional operational risk of transmutation" (19) .
The Department of Energy has proposed that geological storage of spent fuel be kept open for possible retrieval for at least 100 years after emplacement begins (20) . This would allow time for thorough examination of alternative approaches to final disposition while the long-term future of nuclear power is clarified.
Thus, the Cheney report's recommendation of renewed U.S. government support of reprocessing R&D reflects a 1970's vision of the near-term future of nuclear power. Today, it appears that both nonproliferation and the nuclear power establishment would be best served by focusing on the basics during the coming decades and sticking to the simple, economical "once-through" (i.e., nonreprocessing) fuel cycle.
